Masqueraders in computer intrusion detection are people who use somebody else's computer account. We i n v estigate a number of statistical approaches for detecting masqueraders. To e v aluate them, we collected UNIX command data from 50 users and then contaminated the data with masqueraders. The experiment w as blinded. We show results from our methods and two approaches from the computer science community.
Introduction
Intrusion detection in computer science is an appealing problem area because of its importance and the widespread interest in the subject, as evidenced by the report of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection 1998.
There are many di erent t ypes of intrusions. Denning 1997 divides attacks into 8 basic categories: eavesdropping and packet sni ng passive i n terception of network trafc snooping and downloading tampering or data diddling unauthorized changes to data or records spoo ng impersonating other users, e.g. by forging the originating email address, or by gaining password access jamming or ooding overwhelming a system's resources, e.g. by a n email ood injecting malicious code via oppy disks, email attachments, etc.
exploiting design or implementation aws often bu er over ows; overows overwrite other data and can be used to get control over a system cracking passwords and keys
Due to a lack of actual intrusions or at least due to our belief that we have n o i n truders inside our rewall we focus here on a common form of spoo ng, namely on detecting masquerades. Masqueraders are people who impersonate other people on the computer. They could be the o spring of users who use their parents' company account inspite of company policy, they could be users that play jokes on other users, or they could be malicious intruders intentionally trying to hide their identity b y impersonating other users. They could also be intruders from outside -although in practice most outside intruders immediately try to gain access to the account of the superuser and therefore are a special case. A computer crime and security survey Computer Security Institute, 1998 ranking computer security problems in terms of their estimated nancial damage found that unauthorized access by insiders was most damaging, accounting for about one third of the total loss.
Methods for computer intrusion detection fall into two broad categories: pattern recognition and anomaly detection. Pattern recognition refers to attempting to recognize the attack signatures of previously observed intrusions. It is our impression that computer scientists consider pattern recognition as the rst line of defense. Clearly, it can be very powerful when the intrusion method is known. Unfortunately, like researchers, hackers come up with new ideas but unlike researchers they do not publish their work, at least not before an attack. Anomaly detection can defend against novel attacks and it is here that statistics seems most useful.
In anomaly detection, usually a historical pro le is built for each user, and su ciently large deviations from the pro le indicate a possible intruder. Anomaly detection is not useful for most of the categories mentioned above and probably most appropriate for detecting masquerades. All commercial intrusion detection systems that we are aware of use pattern recognition, while some, like IDES Lunt et al. 1992, NIDES and Emerald Porras and Neumann 1997 use both approaches.
The literature focuses on a vast array of speci c approaches to computer intrusion detection. For a general overview see Denning and Denning 1997 or Amoroso 1998 . We describe two of the computer science approaches to anomaly detection that are directly relevant to this article in Section 3.
This article is structured as follows: In the next section we discuss the data and the experiment that we designed to compare several anomaly detection methods. In Section 3 we describe our methods and also two approaches from the computer science community. Section 4 then analyzes the results 3 of the experiment and Section 5 concludes with a discussion.
Data and Experimental Design 2.1 Data
Under the UNIX operating system users give commands. For example, a user might t ype more myfile in order to read myfile one screen at a time. In this example more is the command and myfile is an argument to that command. As a second example, typing chmod +777 myfile allows all users to read, write and execute myfile. Here both +777 and myfile are considered arguments, +777 speci es who exactly can read and or write and or execute myfile.
Our data source is the UNIX acct auditing mechanism. Examples of some auditing entries are given in Table 1 Table 1 : Examples of accounting entries generated by the UNIX acct auditing mechanism two elds, Command Name" and User".
The rst 15; 000 commands for each of about 70 users were recorded over a time period of several months. The time span it took to collect 15; 000 commands di ers vastly from user to user. Some generate this many commands in a few days, others in a few months.
While the availability of arguments would be desirable, they were not collected because of privacy concerns. Some commands recorded by the system are implicitly and not explicitly typed by the user. A shell le is a le that contains multiple commands. Therefore running a shell le will cause all of its commands to be recorded. This also includes so called .profile les, and make les. Names of executables i.e., programs are also interpreted as commands since they are recorded in the audit stream.
Experimental Design
We randomly selected 50 users to serve a s i n trusion targets. We then used the remaining users as masqueraders and interspersed their data into the data of the 50 users.
For simplicity, w e decided to decompose each user's data into 150 blocks of 100 commands each. The rst 50 blocks 5000 commands of all users are kept aside as training data -as far as we know they are not contaminated by masqueraders. For blocks 51 through 150 we made the simpli cation that a block is contaminated either completely or not at all -there are no mixed blocks.
Starting with block 51, we insert masquerading data as follows: If no masquerader is present, a new masquerader appears in the following block with a 1 probability. If a masquerader is present, the same masquerader continues to be present in the following block with a probability of 80. Data that correspond to di erent masqueraders are always separated by at least one block of uncontaminated data. Inserting masquerading data increases the number of commands. We truncate the data to 150 blocks per user in order not to give a w a y the amount of masquerading data inserted.
Masquerading data are drawn from the data of masquerading users as follows: We determine the length of the masquerade and choose a masquerader and a start data block at random. The random choice was repeated if there were not enough contiguous masquerading data left or if the masquerading data were previously used.
We conducted the study in a blind fashion: none of the investigators knew the locations or number of the masqueraders at the time they were analyzing the data. The investigators knew the probabilities with which a masquerader would appear and disappear but were not allowed to use this information. The only piece of information used was the fact that masquerades only start at the beginning of blocks and so did the individual tests for masqueraders.
The data used in this experiment are available for download from http: www.research.att.com schonlau .
Overview of Methods
In what follows we describe distinct approaches labeled, Uniqueness", Bayes 1-Step Markov", Hybrid Multi-Step Markov", Compression", and two additional methods from the computer science literature labeled IPAM" and Sequence-Match". All methods attempt to detect anomalies and should be thought of as subsystems rather than as stand-alone intrusion detection systems.
The methods all operate in essentially the same way. First, the 5000 commands of training data are used to construct user pro les. Then, for each block of 100 commands, a score is computed and if the score exceeds a threshold, an alarm indicating a potential masquerade is triggered. When data are deemed to be free of masquerades they may be used to update the pro les. For each method we will describe how to generate the score as part of the model, how to set thresholds, and how to update the pro le.
Before we describe the various methods, we rst introduce some notation that is common to several methods: 6 C training data command names c test data command names C ut t th command of user u of the training data N ujk number of times user u used the command sequence j; k in the training data N uk number of times user u used command k in the training data N u length of user u's training data sequence n ujk ; n uk ; n u as above for test data in a block being evaluated x ub Score for user u at block b of method presented U total number of users here 50 U k number of users who have used command k in the training data K total number of distinct commands T number of commands in a test data block here 100 Note that the subscripts u, t and k index users, command order and commands, respectively. When a second subscript is needed to index commands, we use the subscript j.
The command stream for a given user is ordered. To a v oid cumbersome sentences we will occasionally refer to that order as time".
Uniqueness
The uniqueness approach is based on the idea that commands not previously seen in the training data may indicate a masquerading attempt. Moreover, the commands are more indicative the fewer users are known to use that command. This approach is due to Theus and Schonlau 1998. 
Motivation
Uniquely used and unpopular commands are very important for this method. By uniquely used command" we mean that in a pool of users only one user is using that command. An unpopular command is used only by few users.
It turns out that almost half of the UNIX commands appearing in our training data are unique to a single user, and many more are unpopular. Moreover, uniquely used commands account for 3:0 of the data, and commands used by 5 users or less account for 8:3 of the data.
A command has Popularity i if exactly i users use that command. We group the commands such that each group contains only commands with the same popularity. W e assign an ID to each command such that commands from groups with unpopular commands are assigned lower ID's than commands from groups with more popular commands. The order within a group is arbitrary. When plotting the command ID over time" the usage pattern of uniquely used unpopular commands emerges. Such a plot is shown in Figure 1 for the rst 5000 commands of each of 50 users. Groups are separated by a horizontal line. The fact that the Popularity= 1 group takes up approximately the bottom half of Figure 1 shows that about half of all commands are uniquely used, and many more are unpopular.
Model
We de ne a test statistic that builds on the notion of unpopular and uniquely used commands: 
Figure 1: Visualization of Command Popularity. Each panel corresponds to one user. Within each user's panel, each of the user's commands is represented by a single dot. The popularity corresponding to each command is plotted versus time" di erent commands with the same popularity h a v e di erent ordinates within their popularity group.
The fraction 1 , U k =U acts as a uniqueness index: it is zero if all users have used this command before, it is 1 if none of the users has used it before. The weights W uk control whether the uniqueness index should be added or subtracted, depending on whether the command was seen before or not. Hence a user will tend to score low if he she uses commands similar to the ones he she used in the training data. The order in which the commands appear does not matter. The quantity v uk =v k represents the command usage relative to other users. It reduces the score contribution of commands that 9 other users often use and this user rarely.
Thresholds
We assign the same threshold to all users. This threshold is estimated via cross validation: we split the original training data into two data sets of 4000 and 1000 commands. Using the larger data set as training data, we assign scores for the smaller one. This is repeated 5 times, each time assigning scores to a distinct set of 1000 commands. We set the threshold to the 99 th percentile of the combined scores across all users and all 5 cross validations. For our data the resulting threshold is 0:2319.
We i n v estigated assigning di erent thresholds to di erent users, in the way to be described for the compression method Section 3.4.2. It turned out that individual thresholds tended to yield a false alarm missing alarm tradeo inferior to the one based on a common threshold for all users. This may be due to the fact that scores are interpretable for all users in the same way: e.g. a negative score indicates that the test data contains few or no incidences of new commands and therefore are not suspicious.
Updating
This method is particularly sensitive to contamination of the training data. Using all alarm-free test data for updating therefore does not seem sensible. Instead we i n troduce a more conservative second threshold for updating: if the test score remains below the updating threshold then the corresponding data are added to the training data.
In choosing the updating threshold, we note that a masquerader who uses mostly common commands can get a score of slightly below zero, and at the same time contaminate the pool of commands by using a few of his her own uniquely used commands. To a v oid that possibility, w e set the updating threshold somewhat arbitrarily to ,0:05.
Updating the training data set means updating the vector of distinct commands and the matrix that contains a count o f h o w often each user used a command. Updated scores can be recomputed from that matrix. Here we recompute the scores after every 2000 test commands i.e. after commands 7000, 9000, 11000, and 13000. While non-simultaneous updating is possible, we c hose to update simultaneously for all users, as if all users were submitting commands at the same rate.
Bayes 1 Step Markov
The Uniqueness approach only considered command frequencies. The Bayes
Threshold
The threshold is determined from the training data the rst 5000 commands for each user by cross validation. We assign an individual threshold for each user. For each user and each of the 50 blocks of 100 commands, we compute 
Updating
After every 2000 test commands for a given user i.e., after commands 7000, 9000, 11000 and 13000 we consider updating the training data. When no alarm was raised in the most recent 5000 commands for a given user, then the training data set is replaced by the most recent 5000 commands and the threshold for this user is recomputed more precisely, w e recompute x cv u only, not . If one or more alarms were raised, the previous training data and threshold remain in place. 
Additional Methods
We h a v e not been able to use commercial intrusion detection tools on our data. A problem with the commercial systems that have an anomaly detection component is that they expect the data in a speci c format. For example, CMDS Computer Misuse Detection System, 1999 expects events at the system call level and then reconstructs the UNIX audit trail from the system calls.
The authors' methods are compared to two methods from the computer science community. W e v ery brie y describe these methods here.
IPAM
Incremental Probabilistic Action Modeling" IPAM is the name of an algorithm by D a vison and Hirsh 1998. It is based on 1-step command transition probabilities estimated from the training data. The estimated probabilities are updated continually, using an exponential updating scheme. That is, upon arrival of a new command all transition probabilities from the penultimate command to another command are aged by m ultiplying them with , and 1 , is added to the most recent transition. Davison and Hirsh's choice of is :9. Given a command it is then possible to predict the next command by choosing the one corresponding to the highest transition probability. A prediction is labeled good, if the next command turns out to be among the top four predicted commands. The fraction of good predictions of the test data forms the score. If the fraction falls below a threshold, an alarm is raised. The thresholds are estimated from the training data in an ad hoc fashion.
Sequence-Match
For each new command, Lane and Brodley 1998 compute a similarity measure between the most recent 10 commands and a users's pro le. A user's pro le consists of command sequences of length 10 that the user has used in the past. The similarity measure is a count of the number of matches in a command-by-command comparison of two command sequences, with a greater weight assigned to adjacent matches. This similarity measure is computed for the test data sequence paired with each command sequence in the pro le. The maximum of all similarity v alues computed forms the score for the test command sequence. Since these scores are very noisy, the most recent 100 scores are averaged. If the average score is below a threshold an alarm is raised.
The threshold is determined based on the quantiles of the empirical distribution of average scores. The initial pro les based on the training data contain 4991 command sequences for each user.
Results
The experimental setup described in Section 2 yielded a total of 40 masquerader incidents for the 50 users. These incidents account for 4:74 of the data. There were at most three incidents for any one user, and 21 of the users had no masquerader at all. Half the masqueraders were present for four or fewer blocks, while three masqueraders were present for 20 , 22 blocks.
Overall Results
We will rst visually inspect when various methods gave alarms and when a masquerader was present. This can be seen in Figure 2 for Hybrid Multi-
Step Markov, Bayes 1-Step Markov, Uniqueness, and Compression methods. Each r o w corresponds to one user and each column to one block of data. The presence of a color indicates that the corresponding method gave a n alarm. The red background shading indicates the presence of masqueraders. Whether an alarm was raised or not was based on thresholds supplied by the respective methods. All methods except IPAM and Sequence-Match w ere Table 2 : False alarms and missing alarms for all methods. The investigators corresponding to the rst four methods were asked to target a false alarm rate of 1.
asked to target a false alarm rate of 1. The false alarm rates achieved for this data set are given in Table 2 . None of the methods accomplished this goal, suggesting that it is di cult to control the false alarm rate. The missing alarms range from 30 to 60 per cent. Because of di erent false alarm missing alarm rates, some colors show up more often in Figure 2 .
When a masquerader is present, often either all three or none of the methods raise an alarm. This may suggest that masqueraders fall into two groups: easy to detect and very di cult to detect. While the methods sometimes give false alarms jointly e.g. User 13, User 27 di erent methods seem to be prone to false alarms for di erent users e.g. yellow -user 16, green -user 12, blue -user 33. Particularly interesting is that false alarms often appear in long sequences. It also appears that while methods raise false alarms for di erent users, they discover the same masqueraders at about the same time. Figure 2 showed alarms for all users. Now w e will look at the actual scores of all methods for selected users.
Selected Individuals
The 8 panels in Figure 3 correspond to 8 particular users. Each panel displays standardized scores over time" for all methods. Each color corresponds to a di erent method. The horizontal axis -labeled 1 through 100 -corresponds to the 100 blocks of testing data. The scores are standardized such that the horizontal line in the center represents the threshold value for all 100 blocks and for all methods. Thus, if any line crosses above the center line, that method raises an alarm at that point. The thresholds used here are the ones supplied by each method, meaning that all methods have di erent false alarm rates as given in Table 2 . Standardized scores are not comparable across plots since the standardizations are di erent for each plot. Gray shading indicates the presence of a masquerader. Lines crossing above the threshold when no gray shading is present are thus false alarms.
In what follows we comment on individual panels:
User 9: During the rst 8 blocks of the rst masquerader the scores of half the methods jump up, indicating an alarm, while the scores for the other methods jump down. The features of the scores of the two groups are exactly reversed. We h ypothesize that during these blocks this masquerader did not use unusual new commands uniqueness score is low and the commands were somewhat repetitive compression score is low but the transition between familiar commands were unusual all transition methods have high scores. It turns out that the data between about commands 8200 and 8900 consist of repeated sequences sed, ln, sh. User 9 had used all three commands separately before, but the 1-step transitions sed, ln and ln, sh never appeared before. The rst and the second masquerader happen to be the same person. This is the only time this happened in our experiment.
User 10: During the presence of the masquerader the score of all methods remains constant. The only method not detecting the masquerader is the compression method. We h ypothesize that the masquerader did something unusual that was very easy to compress. It turns out that the masquerading data consists of a single repeated command: popper. User 10 never used this command before. Clearly, the masquerading data are highly repetitive and thus can be compressed easily.
User 12: There is a masquerader present for 6 blocks that not a single method discovers. This raises the question whether the intrusion is discoverable at all. Nothing unusual was found in the data.
User 18: There is one masquerader that some methods capture precisely. Around block 2 0 e v ery single method raises an alarm in the absence of a masquerader. There seems to be a true anomaly that does not happen to be a masquerader. User 18 uses the commands get acc , line.pro and acc.prof, which did not appear in the training data.
There are also some unusual command transitions.
User 25: Masqueraders 1 and 3 are detected well by most methods, but no method detects the second masquerader.
There is a delayed reaction by all methods to the rst masquerader except IPAM, which fails to raise an alarm. It turns out that at the onset of the masquerading attempt there are a lot of common commands like ls, more and sendmail. Later, the more unusual sequence of commands driver, edgcpfe, uopt, ugen, as1 appears a number of times. During the presence of the third masquerader, all scores take a small dip at the same time, indicating that they are highly correlated. It turns out that the data of the masquerader is dominated by sequences of the form mars.sh, grep, ping, grep. The dip is caused when the sequences temporarily occur less frequently than before and after.
User 30: All methods are highly correlated over the entire 100 blocks. While not all methods raise an alarm remember that methods are not standardized to the same false alarm rate, the score clearly peaks during the presence of the masquerader. It turns out that the data of User 30 is highly repetitive: the command sequence rdistd, tcsh, rshd repeats itself over and over for the most part. User 42: Surprisingly, the distribution of the scores during the presence of the masquerader is essentially bimodal for all methods.
User 44: The two masqueraders are perfectly captured by most methods. It turns out that the second masquerading attempt consists several hundred repetitions of the command popper. Therefore the compression method fails to detect the masquerader. The reason that SequenceMatch misses this masquerader is likely due to an updating problem: while User 44 never uses popper, the rst masquerader does. Since Sequence-Match did not detect the rst masquerader, sequences containing this command may h a v e been added to User 44's pro le, leading to a failure to detect the second masquerader.
Correlation of Methods
Apparently scores are correlated very highly. We ran several cluster algorithms using the correlation matrix as a measure of similarity. The Methods Uniqueness and Hybrid Multi-Step Markov with a correlation coe cient o f : 79 clearly are part of the same cluster. This may be due to the fact that the hybrid elements of the Hybrid Multi-Step Markov method focus on rare and unique commands similar to the way the Uniqueness method does. A second group is formed by the two methods contributed from the computer science community, namely IPAM and Sequence-Match. The correlation coe cient b e t w een these two groups is :62. Depending on the clustering algorithm the Bayes 1-Step Markov method could be associated with either of these two groups. Given that both IPAM and Bayes 1-Step Markov are based on the 1-step command transition matrix, it is surprising that both methods are more highly correlated with other methods than with each other.
26
The compression method stands by itself. Its highest correlation coecient -with the uniqueness method -is :57.
ROC curves and survival analysis
Up to now i t w as di cult to compare methods because the visualizations were based on di erent false alarm rates. By varying the thresholds we obtain di erent tradeo s between false alarms and missing alarms. The curve that shows the functional relationship between false alarms and missing alarms is called a ROC curve.
Since some methods have di erent thresholds for di erent users there is a question of how t o v ary the thresholds. We add a constant to all individual thresholds and then compute the corresponding alarm rates. We ignore the possibility that di erent thresholds might h a v e some e ect on the updating algorithm. Figure 4 displays ROC curves for all methods. The lower and the further left a curve is, the better it is. For the best methods, one per cent false alarms corresponds to about 70 missing alarms; and ve per cent false alarms corresponds to about 30 missing alarms. The compression method seems to be uniformly inferior to other methods. Between 1 and 5 false alarms the uniqueness methods clearly dominates the other methods. IPAM and Sequence-Match are surprisingly similar for high false alarms. For a very low false alarm rate : 5, they do better than all other methods.
When using ROC curves, the unit of analysis is the block rather than the intrusion. It is also of interest to see how long an intrusion survives" before it is detected. Figure 5 gives the probability o f a n i n trusion surviving as a function of the number of data blocks when the false alarm rate for all methods is xed at 1. After the rst block b e t w een 15 and 30 of the intrusions are caught, after about 10 blocks about 40 , 50 are caught.
The compression method does worse than that. 
ROC curves without updating
All analyses were based on the updating algorithms as described in Section 3. Figure 6 gives the ROC curves of algorithms based solely on the initial training data. Methods Sequence-Match and Compression perform better without updating. For compression this is directly attributable to the following di culties associated with the updating algorithm: Since we do not update training data with test data that had high scores to avoid contamination with masquerading data, the average score for the training data tends to decrease. As the consequence the thresholds -calculated from the updated training data -decrease too. Eventually normal variation in the scores starts looking like a masquerading attempt. While this is a problem for all methods, it turned out to be especially severe for the compression method. Both the Uniqueness and Hybrid Multi-Step Markov methods bene ted from updating. This was not obvious given that methods may be vulnerable from updating the training data with masquerading data especially the Uniqueness method. : ROC curves for all methods except IPAM for which no data was available. Methods do not use updating.
Discussion
All methods detect anomalies in command usage. We h a v e shown that all methods can detect anomalies surprisingly well considering the paucity o f information.
In essence, we try to classify data into two groups which one might label good" and bad". However, we h a v e t o c haracterize good" in the absence of training data for bad". It is interesting to re ect on how our methods cope with this problem: The Hybrid Multi-Step Markov method explicitly assumes that the masquerader resembles one of the other users. To a lesser extent, the Uniqueness method and the Bayes 1-Step markov method also assume that through the concept of command popularity and parameter estimation of the Dirichlet distribution, respectively. The compression method has an inherent notion of what bad" constitutes.
The experiment has led to more insight i n to the di erent methods:
The uniqueness method can be severely a ected by accidental contamination of the training data with rare commands from the masquerading data. Further, a single threshold for all users works better than individual thresholds for each user. The uniqueness method is the easiest to compute yet it was the most powerful at anomaly detection in our experiment. It is an open question whether this success can be repeated in other contexts.
The compression method is vulnerable to updating the training data with homogeneous data. It has also di culties with updating algorithms.
The Markov method -while very successful -is computationally demanding. While only used 5 of the time, the hybrid elements of the Hybrid Multi-Step Markov method did improve its ROC curve.
The Bayes 1-Step Markov method did slightly worse than the Markov and the Uniqueness methods, but it is more robust than Uniqueness and is not as computationally intensive as the Markov method.
Previously, w e i n v estigated another approach based on principal components analysis of one step command transition frequencies DuMouchel, Schonlau, 1998a and 1998b. This approach w as abandoned because it required very voluminous user pro les and was not easily extensible to make use of the information in unpopular unique commands.
To some extent, the performance of various methods is substantially the same. For example, the ROC curves in Figures 4 and 6 do not di er dramatically. Nevertheless, the curves do di er, and we believe these di erences to be meaningful. One interpretation is that any sensible approach compression is a good example works pretty w ell, because some intrusions are easy to detect. But going from working pretty w ell to working well requires insight and e ort.
None of the methods described here could sensibly serve as the sole means of detecting computer intrusions. The relatively high missing alarm rates preclude this. We h a v e presented a collection of tools. They would be part of an overall strategy that might include both attack signatures and analysis of more detailed data, including time stamps and command arguments.
In our opinion our contribution to the eld of intrusion detection is as follows: We i n troduced a theoretical framework to detect masquerades by formulating hypotheses and applying statistical theory to test them. We introduced ROC curves to make comparisons between di erent i n trusion detection methods possible. We made a substantive discovery with the Uniqueness method introducing the popularity score as a valuable component o f a command pro le. We w ere able to combine the concepts of Dirichlet priors, shrinkage estimation, Bayes factors, and sparse matrix computation for the detection of masquerades. We i n troduced a way to toggle between di erent methods, in our case between the Multi-Step Markov and the Independence Model. We found ways to reduce the dimensionality of the Multi-Step Markov model. One of our goals was to bring this exciting area to the attention of the statistical community. We believe that there is a lot of room for further investigation.
